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CASE NOTES
Torts-CONFLICT OF LAwS-FLORIDA ABANDONS LEX Loci DELICTI,
AGAIN-Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla.
1980).
When a tort action has elements involving Florida, but also
other elements significantly relating to at least one other jurisdic-
tion, Florida chose to follow the doctrine of lex loci delicti. This
choice of law doctrine provides that "the rights of parties to a tort
action are governed by the law of the place where the tort was
committed."2 Lex loci delicti is the traditional choice of law doc-
trine and is the foundation of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS' as well as the works of numerous other early theorists." The
doctrine is a product of a territorial conception of vested rights in
which no recovery may be obtained in one state for injuries to a
person sustained in another state, "unless the infliction of the inju-
ries is actionable under the law of the state in which they were
received."'5 "[A] right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation
to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and de-
pends for its existence and extent solely on such law." Lex loci
delicti has enjoyed wide support because of its virtues of uniform-
ity, consistency, and predictability, all resulting in rules simple in
form and administration.7
Beginning in earnest in 1959, however, with the Wisconsin deci-
sion of Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,8 the doctrine be-
gan to suffer disintegration' as more and more states abandoned it
in favor of alternative theories less rooted in territoriality or vested
rights and grounded instead in flexible policy-oriented ap-
proaches.10 Criticism of lex loci delicti has centered on the haphaz-
1. Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972); Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Astor Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759
(Fla. 1952).
2. Astor Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 1952).
3. Sections 377-97 (1934).
4. E.g., 2 J. BEALE, TREATISE ON Tm CoNFLcT OF LAws (1935); J. STORY, CoMMENTARIEs
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1841).
5. Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805 (Ala. 1892).
6. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281; 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
7. R. CRAWroN, D. CuRm & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 13 (2d ed. 1975).
8. 95 N.W.2d 814, 7 Wis. 2d 130 (1959). The academic work generally credited with inau-
gurating the realist revolt against the RESTATEMENT'S principles is W. COOK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASIs OF THE CONuICT OF LAws (1942). It was not until Haurnschild in 1959,
though, that the reaction movement gained major strength in the courts.
9. Bayitch, Conflict of Laws: Florida 1968-69, 24 U. MLa L. REv. 433, 476 (1970).
10. For a listing of states abandoning lex loci delicti, see Bishop v. Florida Specialty
Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 n.2 (Fla. 1980).
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ard and unjust results reached in many cases when the purely arbi-
trary circumstance of where a tort occurred controlled all
questions of substantive law in that case. 1 As one influential deci-
sion noted,
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours'
duration pass through several of those commonwealths. His plane
may meet with disaster in a State he never intended to cross but
into which the plane has flown because of bad weather or other
unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent
may begin in one State and end in another. The place of injury
becomes entirely fortuitous."'
The 1967 case of Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.18
presented the Florida Supreme Court with the question of whether
to abandon the lex loci delicti rule. The court acted in response to
a question certified to it by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Hopkins, a Florida citizen, had purchased a roundtrip ticket
in Tampa for a flight aboard Northwest Airlines from Tampa to
Chicago. The airplane crashed in Illinois killing all aboard. The
plaintiff, Hopkins's widow, brought suit in Florida against both the
airline and Lockheed. Northwest settled out of court for $32,500
and Lockheed then moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the Illinois statutory limitation of damages which set a
$30,000 cap on recovery for wrongful death, precluded any cause of
action by the plaintiff against it. The trial judge granted the mo-
tion and plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals, which certified
to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether Florida or
Illinois law would control.14 By a 5-2 decision, the Florida Supreme
Court abandoned lex loci delicti in favor of a more flexible ap-
proach that took into account the competing policies of each state
involved. The court relied upon the then new RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (hereinafter the SECOND RESTATEMENT)
significant relationship test"5 in holding that Florida law would
control over Illinois law.
The significant relationship test adopted by the court is pre-
mised upon the idea that the rights and liabilities of litigants are
11. 19 UNIV. FLA. L. Rv. 730, 731 (1967).
12. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527; 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135
(1961).
13. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
14. Id. at 749-50.
15. Id. at 747.
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based upon the local law of the state having the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties." In most cases, this
would be the state where the injury occurred unless outweighed by
other factors. 17 These elements include the needs of the interstate
and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum state;
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative in-
terests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underly-
ing the particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uni-
formity of result; and ease in the determination and application of
the law to be applied.18 All these components would somehow be
measured, balanced and juxtaposed to determine which state's law
would apply.
Florida's abnegation of lex loci delicti lasted but five months.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed itself on a rehearing of the
case and reinstated the doctrine in Florida. The court noted the
"obvious virtues" of the rule since it was based on "objective and
stable standards."19 More importantly, though, the 4-3 majority
appeared hesitant to overrule lex loci delicti because, first, the
question had been certified by a federal court and the supreme
court wished that interpretation of Florida's conflict of law rules
develop from the proven method of judicial case disposition;20 sec-
ond, the case sounded in warranty not tort and hence lex loci
delicti may not be implicated at all;"1 and, third, the plaintiff was
not deprived of any cause of action in Illinois, only part of a recov-
ery, since she had been able to sue under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act. 9 Finally, the court warned that "[wie are not per-
suaded that this case presents any necessity or justification for
abandonment of guiding principles [of lex loci delicti]. ' 3
The case that did persuade the Florida Supreme Court to aban-
don, again, the doctrine of lex loci delicti in tort actions is Bishop
v. Florida Specialty Paint Company.24 Like Hopkins, this case in-
volved an airplane crash. But there the similarity ends. In Bishop,
both the plaintiffs and the defendant pilot of the Florida-based
16. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 145.
17. Id., §146.
18. Id., § 6.
19. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 752.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 751.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
24. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
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Cessna were Florida residents. The plane was leased to the defen-
dant Florida corporation, and the July 4, 1975 weekend trip began
in Florida and was to end in Florida after a stay in the North Car-
olina mountains. En route, the plane crashed in South Carolina. 8
At the time of the crash, South Carolina had an airplane guest
statute that limited actions by a non-paying aircraft guest to inten-
tional misconduct or those accidents caused by heedless or reckless
disregard for the rights of others." Florida law, on the other hand,
required only a showing of ordinary negligence since it had no air-
craft guest statute and its related automobile guest statute had
been repealed years earlier.2 7 In Duval County Circuit Court, sum-
mary judgment was entered in favor of the defendant pilot and
aircraft owner since plaintiffs conceded that the negligence charged
was only ordinary and would not rise to the level necessary to show
a cause of action in South Carolina. South Carolina law, of course,
was said to control due to the Florida lex loci delicti doctrine.2 8
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed,"
"[d]espite the uncertainties created by the court's actions in Hop-
kins of first receding from the lex loci delicti rule (by a vote of 4 to
3) [sic] and then, on rehearing granted, reversing its original opin-
ion (by a vote of 4 to 3). .. ."30 The district court, though, did
certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question:
Does the lex loci delicti rule govern the rights and liabilities of
the parties in tort actions, precluding consideration by the Flor-
ida courts of other relevant considerations, such as the policies
and purposes underlying the conflicting laws of a foreign jurisdic-
tion where the tort occurred, and the relationship of the occur-
rence and of the parties to such policies and purposes? 1
It is this question that the Florida Supreme Court answered in
the negative in an opinion by Justice England with only Justice
Boyd dissenting.82 The court's opinion provides scant authority
and no coherent justification for its decision to rejoin the SECOND
25. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5.
26. S.C. Code § 55-1-10 (1976).
27. The Florida Automobile Guest Statute, ch. 18033, 1937 Fla. Laws 671, repealed by
ch. 72-1, 1972 Fla. Laws 113.
28. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 377 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 768. The Hopkins opinion was actually 5-2 on first hearing and 4-3 on rehear-
ing. See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d at 744, 748, 749, 752.
31. 389 So. 2d at 1000.
32. Id. at 999.
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RESTATEMENT on the lex loci delicti issue. Referring only to sec-
tions 145 and 146 of the SECOND RESTATEMENT, the Hopkins opin-
ion, and the opinion of the district court below, the Bishop court
simply announced in per curiam fashion that the new rule will not
treat lex loci delicti as dispositive. What appears to emanate from
the opinion is that the court decried the lack of flexibility of the
lex loci delicti rule "particularly in the case of aviation acci-
dents."33 The court signaled its new position by applauding ra-
tional, over mechanical standards." In addition, the court wished
to join those other states that had adopted the "more flexible,
modern approach to this aspect of conflicts of law."'
The opinion appears to be a scaled-down version of the recent
opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Gutierrez v. Collins,"
making Texas the Twenty-fifth state in addition to the District of
Columbia to reject lex loci delicti in favor of some alternative ap-
proach.3 7 The Gutierrez case involved a car accident between two
Texas residents that occurred in Mexico. After a lengthy review of
Texas statutory and common law on lex loci delicti, the court dis-
cussed major arguments in favor of the retention of the rule and
attempted to demonstrate how those arguments were no longer
tenable. 8 The court then concluded that a new rule was needed
that was more in tune with modern society.
Not surprisingly, Texas chose the SECOND RESTATEMENT'S most
significant relationship test after comparing it with other choice-
oriented approaches. The Florida Supreme Court seems to have
taken the skeleton of the Texas court decision and adopted it for
33. Id. at 1000.
34. Id. at 1001.
35. Id..
36. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
37. See note 9 supra.
38. 583 S.W.2d at 317. The court discussed three arguments in favor of lex loci delicti
and each argument's rebuttal. First, the rule provides uniformity, consistency, and predict-
ability; however, results reached were "most often arbitrary and unjust." In response, judges
formulated exceptions to the rule or withheld its application by "strained characterizations
of the facts." This then undercut the purported virtues of the rule. Second, the alternatives
to the lex loci rule all lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results, with public and profes-
sional confusion about the outcome; however, it may be true that other theories have "grow-
ing pains" but the added flexibility of the alternative theories are worth the burden. In
addition, ease of administration "is a wholly inadequate reason for retention of an unjust
rule." Finally stare decisis blocks any attempt to abandon the historic rule of lex loci delicti;
however, stare decisis creates only a rebuttable presumption in favor of an established law.
"Stare decisis prevents change for the sake of change; it does not prevent any change at all."
Modern transportation requires a law that recognizes its complex character; when a "time-
worn rule" is no longer useful, it should be changed. Id.
19811
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its own, leaving out all other parts of the body of the decision. A
more principled decision by the Florida court would have been
more structurally sound.
The Bishop decision replaces the lex loci delicti doctrine in Flor-
ida with the significant relationship test of the SECOND RESTATE-
MENT, sections 6, 145, and 146. Taken together, those sections state
the general principle that "[tihe rights and liabilities of the parties
with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties. . ."9 viewed in light
of contacts with each state of each participant. Concerning the
three sections, the court's only supplied emphasis in the decision
was its accentuation of the following language from section 146:
"... the local law of the state where the injury occurred deter-
mines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect
to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship . . .. 40
It is unclear from the Bishop opinion whether the court wished
to stress the first or the last clause of the emphasized portion. Both
are given support in the opinion. If the court wished to stress the
first clause, then its statement that "[t]he state where the injury
occurred would, under most circumstances, be the decisive consid-
eration in determining the applicable choice of law, 4 1 is most in-
structive. Yet the opposite is seen in the court's statement that
"[oither factors may combine to outweigh the place of injury as a
controlling consideration .... ,, What one is left with, then, is this:
the doctrine of lex loci delicti is no longer applicable in Florida; the
most significant relationship test as presented in the SECOND RE-
STATEMENT is the norm, but the application of the most significant
relationship test is unclear in its details.
The court supplied no guidelines by which to apply the new sig-
nificant relationship test. The difficulty encountered by courts in
applying this test has been recognized. As one commentator noted
on the first abandonment of lex loci delicti in Hopkins,
New York, the first state to adopt the new standard, has had
some difficulty applying it to more complex fact situations. Fu-
39. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 145.
40. Bishop v. Florida Speciality Paint Co., 389 So.2d at 1001, citing SECOND RESTATE-
mErr (Emphasis supplied by court).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1001.
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ture difficulty will stem not only from more complex fact situa-
tions but also from a lack of agreement among scholars as to the
relevance of specific contacts, whether contacts should be weighed
quantitatively or qualitatively, and as to which state's law should
apply when the contacts are evenly balanced. 43
There has been much criticism of the methodology of the SECOND
RESTATEMENT'S position. Most of this criticism centers upon the
inherent subjectivity of the approach on the one hand and the fear
of a degeneration into mere contact counting on the other." The
Florida Supreme Court in Bishop addressed none of these
problems, and the opinion seemed blithely unaware of the neces-
sary uncertainties of using the significant relationship test.
It is worth speculating why the court decided to abandon lex loci
delicti at this time, when in fact it could have retained the rule and
still ended up with the same result. Petitioner in her brief states
.that she is not asking the court to abandon the lex loci delicti doc-
trine; instead she would have the court apply a public policy ex-
ception and have Florida refuse application of South Carolina law
since its use would deprive a Florida citizen of access to the courts
for redress of her injuries.45 But even this exceptional approach,
savoring of the untidy and the ad hoc, would have been unneces-
sary in Bishop due to the fact that the reason for the plaintiff's
failure to state a cause of action, i.e., South Carolina's airplane
guest statute, had already been impliedly overruled by South Caro-
lina in Ramey v. Ramey.4' That case was an equal protection at-
tack on the South Carolina automobile guest statute. The South
Carolina court found the statute to be unconstitutional under both
the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. Of impor-
tance to Bishop is the fact that the auto guest statute invalidated
in Ramey is identical to the airplane guest statute, with the word
motor vehicle subsituted for aircraft being the only difference.
43. 19 UNIV. OF FLA. L. REv. 730, 733 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
44. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A
Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1230 (1965).
45. Brief of Petitioner at 21-22.
46. 258 S.E.2d 883, 885-86 (S.C. 1979).
47. South Carolina Statute § 55-1-10 (1976), entitled "Liability of owners and operators
generally to guests", stated:
No person transported by the owner or operator of an aircraft as his guest without
payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against
such aircraft, its owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case of accident
unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or op-
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The South Carolina Supreme Court noted the similarities of the
two statutes in a footnote"' which cited an Idaho case4 9 overruling
that state's aircraft guest statute. In this regard, then, Wheeler v.
State"0 becomes instructive. There, the Florida Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he decisional law in effect at the time appeal is de-
cided governs the issues raised on appeal, even where there has
been a change of law since the time of trial."51 Consequently, the
court could have held under lex loci delicti that the Bishops did
indeed have a cause of action under South Carolina law for simple
negligence. Lex loci delicti did not need to be overturned at all.
No matter how intuitive the Bishop decision may be, this much
is clear: Florida has abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in tort cases
and replaced it with the significant relationship test. While weak in
its rationale, the Bishop decision is even weaker in its understand-
ing of the intricacies of the new test and will be of little help in
guiding Florida's lower courts in balancing significant contacts and
relationships in any meaningful way. Much remains to be done in
order to achieve a workable standard and avoid gross subjectivism.
The future seems to promise that more cases will be litigated in
Florida in an attempt to flesh out the details of this new test. True,
the adoption of the SECOND RESTATEMENT's test does invite consul-
tation with a now large and quite sophisticated body of case law
from other states as well as academic literature putting "flesh" on
the all too rubbery skeleton of sections 145 and 146.2 In the
erator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of
others.
South Carolina Statute § 15-1-290 (1976), entitled "Liability for injury to guests in car",
stated:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages
against such motor vehicle or its owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case
of an accident unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the
rights of others.
48. 258 S.E.2d at 885 n.5.
49. Messmer v. Ker, 524 P.2d 536 (Idaho 1974).
50. 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977).
51. Id. at 245.
52. See, for example, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1968); First Nat'l Bank
v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (11. 1970); Fuerste v.
Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Mitchell
v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Mellk
v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625 (NJ. 1967); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972);
Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'r Co., 428
P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); and Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1976).
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meantime, the court's decision in Bishop voiding lex loci delicti
and substituting the significant relationship test is reminiscent of
the predicament of Lewis Carroll's Alice: "It sounded an excellent
plan, no doubt, and very neatly and simply arranged; the only diffi-
culty was, that she had not the smallest idea how to set about it.'' 8
JERRY J. WAXMAN
TortS-WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD-CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF DECEDENT SPOUSE DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY BY
NON-NEGLIGENT SPOUSE IN THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR
CHILD, Singletary v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 376 So.
2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
The plaintiff father in Singletary v. National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp.' brought a wrongful death action when his wife and two
minor children were killed in an accident at a railroad crossing in
Avon Park. The accident occurred when a train owned by the de-
fendant Amtrack collided with a vehicle operated by the wife of
the plaintiff and occupied by their two children.2 The wife and
children died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.' The
plaintiff father brought the action on behalf of each of the dece-
dents' estates and on his own behalf as survivor of each to recover
damages for the alleged negligence of the railroad in causing the
deaths.4
The jury found the railroad sixty-five percent negligent and Sin-
gletary's wife thirty-five percent negligent.6 In entering the final
judgment for awards for the wrongful deaths, the plaintiff argued
that the court should only reduce the amounts awarded to the
wife's estate and the husband as her survivor in proportion to the
percentage of the wife's negligence, and that no reduction should
be made in the amounts awarded to the father as survivor of the
53. Shapira, "Grasp All, Lose All": On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation
of Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUM. L. Rzv. 248, 251 (1977), citing L. CARROLL, ALICz'S
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND.
1. 376 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
2. Brief for Appellant at 1.
3. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
4. Brief for Appellant at 1.
5. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
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